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Getting Power Back: Court Restoration of Executive Authority in
Boston City Government
This article, originally published in 1985, is based partly on the author’s experience with the
Boston school desegregation case, but goes beyond it. It chronicles some of the events that
occurred when a state and a federal court attempted to disengage from active jurisdiction over
two Boston public systems: the Boston Public Schools and the Boston Housing Authority. It
makes three proposals, which, if enacted, would help to keep the courts out of day-to-day
management of municipal operations. It also makes some generalizations about the court-agency
interplay that are relevant to the post-remedial phase of institutional reform litigation. The
author uses the term “restorative law” to describe this court-controlled process of returning
power to the executive branch.

_________________________________________________________________

Within Boston, a transition has occurred regarding the governance and management of public
services. There is a new structure for the City Council and School Committee and a new
administration team in City Hall and School Department headquarters. A populist air surrounds
municipal government; terms like openness and access are used to describe what was previously
viewed as an insiders’ club.
Besides the changes in representation and mood, another kind of transition has occurred in
local government-one that is intergovernmental and pertains to the relationship between the
courts and the executive branch. Over the past year, the city’s administration has recovered power
from the courts to manage two major segments of municipal operations: Boston’s public housing
and its public schools.
The restoration of administrative authority, autonomy, and accountability is part of an
executive recovery process that occurs in the post-remedial phase of institutional reform
litigation. In place of a bifurcated decision-making structure, divided between courtrooms and
corner offices with their different sets of rules and procedures, the recovery of executive power
reestablishes a single structure for implementing public policy. Since this change takes place as
the result of court action and final decrees, the concept of “restorative law” is used. Restorative
law refers to the executive recovery process; in its broadest context, the concept applies to the
process by which defendants in institutional reform cases demonstrate both the commitment and
capacity to operate a system in compliance with the law.
This article will treat the issue of executive recovery by advancing the concept of restorative
law as it applies to Boston city government. A sketch of historical and contextual factors relevant
to the judicial activism debate will be drawn to facilitate an understanding of the controversy, and
the special nature of court entry into Boston city services will be described. The article will then
identify some of the forces at work that contribute to the executive recovery process and will
outline some of the basic conditions of court disengagement from the public housing and public
school system. In addition to outlining actions that reduce judicial management activity, this
article will make a series of propositions which can help assure that the courts will not have to
reassert their influence within the Boston public administrative realm. Put plainly, this analysis
will specify general conditions conducive to getting the courts out of the business of day-to-day
management of public affairs, and will identify actions which help assure that they don’t have to
get back in.

Background and Historical Context
More than any other big city, Boston is characterized by a shadow system of government:
courtrooms serve as policy-making arenas in addition to corner offices and council or
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1

New England Journal of Public Policy
committee chambers. Many attribute this to a parochial definition of the public interest and sense
of ethical responsibility held by many local officials. The management of public affairs through
the issuance of remedial court decrees, however, became a special phenomenon of the 1970s and
1980s throughout the country. In part due to the unwillingness or inability of public officials to
discharge their duties in a manner consistent with expanding interpretations of constitutional
rights, and in part due to greater procedural access to public law litigation activity, the growth of
so-called judicial activism has blurred the boundaries among the legislative and administrative
branches of government.
Especially since the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education,1 the use of
court-prescribed corrective measures issued to institutions in which constitutional violations are
found to exist has complicated the role of agency managers and subjected the judiciary to a great
deal of criticism. The equitable remedial powers of a court, when exercised over public policy
disputes, often take the form of affirmative decrees that create some form of institutional power
realignment.2
To some, this judicial behavior is a proper response to the shortcomings of legislative and
executive behavior. To others, such behavior represents judicial overreaching and an attack on the
very structure of democratic government.
Within the city of Boston, there are several examples of direct court involvement in the
resolution of public policy disputes. Since the mid-1960s, federal or state courts have played a
role in matters pertaining to school desegregation; education for children with special needs or
possessing limited English-speaking ability; public housing; prisoners’ rights as affected by
facilities at the Charles Street Jail and the Deer Island House of Correction; municipal finance,
dramatically represented by state court involvement in the so-called Tregor dispute of 1981; 3 and
environmental conditions within Boston Harbor.
The resultant forms of court intervention, most visibly displayed in the cases affecting the
Boston School Department, the Boston Housing Authority (BHA), and the Boston Harbor,
followed extended periods of attempts to settle disputes through appeals to legislative or
administrative action.4 Following legislative or administrative inaction, or inappropriate action,
the courts became ineluctably drawn into public administration. Once in, they stayed in: The
remedial phase of the Boston school desegregation case is in its eleventh year; the receivership
affecting the BHA lasted five years.

The Courts’ New Role: The Judge as Manager
The institutional reform aspect of these cases in particular, and judicial activism in general, raises
questions about the validity of the courts’ entry into political and administrative realms. The
debate over judicial activism centers around two primary issues: the propriety or legitimacy of the
courts’ new role, given the separation of powers doctrine contained in the United States
Constitution; and the efficacy or capacity of the courts, as an institution, to carry out
responsibilities that are extrajudicial. In either case, the critical response to judicial activism often
is further divided into concerns based on principles and axioms or partisan disagreements over
the policy outcomes (such as school busing) of judicial decision making.4

The Boston Cases and Governmental Abdication
Before turning to the issue of restoring authority for managing the public’s business to Boston’s
mayor, City Council, and School Committee, it is important to begin with an understanding of
the special character of judicial intervention.
Neither of the two judges Garrity—Paul and Arthur—retained active jurisdiction over the
BHA or the School Department because he had nothing better to do or because he had a secret
yearning for public administration. Despite their differences in manner and temperament, each
Judge Garrity took pains to facilitate a resolution of plaintiff grievances without the necessity of
direct court involvement.5
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In the Findings, Rulings, Opinion and Orders in Perez v. Boston Housing Authority of July
25, 1979, the court took note of “the history of this case and the repeated efforts by the [Plaintiff
Class of] Tenants over the years in seeking and in following up every remedy short of
receivership in order to obtain safe, sanitary and decent housing as mandated by law.”6 Neither
the presence and good efforts of a master (and staff) to perform services on behalf of tenants, nor
the consent decree entered on May 31, 1977, resulted in any significant change in housing
conditions for the city’s poor. Therefore, the court turned to the only remedy that had not yet been
attempted: the appointment of a receiver who would have full authority to administer, manage,
and operate the BHA, with control over BHA funds and revenues. The existing BHA’s Board of
Commissioners was stripped of its powers. Following an appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, in
which it approved the appointment of a receiver, Judge Paul Garrity appointed Lewis H. Spence
as receiver on February 5, 1980.
By 1984, the achievements wrought by Harry Spence and the staff of the Housing Authority
were considered remarkable, both for their contributions to managerial effectiveness and because
they helped ignite the public spirit on matters pertaining to housing. These achievements,
however, might not have been possible had it not been for the sanctions provided by the
receivership. The receiver’s court-ordered responsibilities could be carried out without the
encumbrances of a five-member appointed board and in spite of the reluctance of other public
officials to tackle housing issues. For the duration of Judge Garrity’s receivership (the court
retained its jurisdiction until late 1984), the board was prevented from exercising any authority.
The receiver enjoyed the benefits of autonomy, felt especially in purchasing and personnel
areas. Both figuratively speaking and literally, the task of rebuilding an organization was carried
out brick by brick. The development and installation of modern management systems, the
negotiation of collective bargaining agreements, the fostering of a preventive approach to capital
maintenance, the implementation of performance evaluation systems tied to merit salary
increases—these internal initiatives, in the words of one BHA senior staffer, “have one common
thread:
We’re attempting to get career employees and the rank and file to buy into what
we’re doing. They have an opportunity to be involved, and hopefully don’t have
the impression that we’re trying to impose.
The benefits of the receivership were then noted by the same individual:
The political insulation has been quite useful insofar as management system
developments and morale-related achievements [are concerned]. This doesn’t
mean that we didn’t have to discuss things with the public or negotiate with the
union, but the removal of the impediment was useful.
A different pattern of court-agency relations emerged in Morgan v. Hennigan, the school
desegregation case. Following the liability opinion of June 21, 1974,7 the Student Desegregation
Plan—the first in a series of over 400 remedial orders—was issued by U.S. District Court Judge
W. Arthur Garrity Jr., on May 10, 1975.8 The scope and sweep of the court’s jurisdiction were
unprecedented: Although Judge Garrity utilized remedial guidelines set forth in the Denver
school desegregation case,9 the Boston orders were unique and provoked well-known controversy
at the local, state, and national level. The raw and noisy politicization and polarization
experienced in Phase I and Phase II of the desegregation plan, punctuated by changes in the
superintendency, by School Committee judicial appeals, and by extensive media coverage,
reached its zenith with the partial receivership imposed on South Boston High School on
December 9, 1975.10
The breadth and depth of the court’s intervention came to dominate all aspects of
educational policy-making and practice within the School Department. The bureaucratic labyrinth
of School Department operations, coupled with the reluctance of department officials to carry out
any responsibilities in connection with desegregation unless they were specifically ordered by the
3
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court, contributed to a gradual displacement of administrative authority. Public opposition to
busing, reinforced by the actions of many local officials, became directed to the federal court for
“taking over” the school system.
Through administrative default, the court became more involved with management activities.
This involvement, however, was not as extensive as many portrayed it to be; the level of detail
and the scope of authority contained in the court’s orders, from the summer of 1975 and
continuing through the years, varied from issue to issue. Some orders were broad, leaving a great
deal of administrative discretion to the School Department. Other orders were quite specific,
representing judicial usurpation of administrative authority.
In retrospect, there continues to be disagreement as to the judicial style employed during the
remedial regime: Some claim that Judge Garrity went too far in the use of his authority; others
claim that he did not go far enough. My assessment is that both conclusions are true. As a result,
there always was a question as to where administrative authority ended and judicial authority
began.
A well-known feature of the Boston case is that the character of Judge Garrity’s intervention
incorporated educational as well as equity concerns. The creation of magnet schools and
institutional pairings, the orders pertaining to vocational-occupational education, the partial
receivership imposed on South Boston High School, and the establishment of parent advisory
councils all were designed to reform the school system and infuse it with much-needed vitality.
These reforms supplemented the other remedial tools—racial composition, school or district
consolidation, and transportation—used by the court.
There were managerial byproducts, however, of the court’s intervention that affected the
capacity of the School Department to carry out its educational mission. Even though the earlier
phase of resistance and hostility eventually gave way to greater acceptance of court-ordered
responsibilities, a pattern of administrative dependency set in. Owing both to the erosion of
authority and limited professional capabilities, the School Department came to rely on the court
for directives and, in some cases, used the court to further its own policy or political aims.
Consistent with the political science maxim that institutions in conflict over time begin to
look and act alike,11 the court became entangled with the administrative mechanism it sought to
cure, and the School Department became entangled with the principled incrementalism of the
advocacy process. A cycle of dependence ensued, and a sort of “psyching out the court”
syndrome developed. The department became more passive as the court, since it recognized that
its orders were not necessarily self-executing, became more deeply drawn into managerial
operations. The orders accumulated and became more detailed.
The appointment of Robert C. Wood as superintendent in 1978 marked a turning point in the
court-agency relationship. While progress toward achieving the court’s remedial objectives had
been made under the leadership of Marion Fahey, Wood’s predecessor as superintendent, the
Wood administration sought, via its mandate for reorganization, to achieve voluntary compliance
with many of the major court orders because the court’s remedial objectives were shared.
Expected judicial reaction became only one of the many factors considered in the administrative
decision making and implementation process. From the court’s perspective, many of the
extrajudicial factors with which it concerned itself earlier now were viewed, more or less, as
forces to be managed by school officials.
Despite Wood’s firing in the summer of 1980, there continued to be progress within the
School Department toward compliance with outstanding orders; and despite occasional anti-court
outbursts and criminal problems associated with contract-fixing, the School Committee displayed
a concern for stability and quality in educational operations, a concern that was to become
conducive to and reënforced by the promise of court withdrawal. Especially with the election of
two black members in the fall of 1981, the governance structure and administrative operations of
the Boston public schools became quite different from what existed in 1974 and 1975.
By the time of the city elections of 1983, a succession of actions occurred that set the stage
for the restoration of administrative authority for the School Department and the Housing
Authority. Both judges Garrity signaled their desire to terminate their active jurisdiction and, with
regard to the public schools, began to do so.
4
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The School Case
Four years ago, in May of 1981—six years after the issuance of the Student Desegregation
Plan—Judge W. Arthur Garrity Jr., made known his desire to terminate active jurisdiction in the
Morgan case. The pending departure of former state Commissioner of Education Gregory Anrig,
who provided consistently strong and articulate leadership during most of the court’s
involvement, helped to stimulate a negotiation process designed to produce proposals for final
court orders.12
Because of the court’s tendency to view the State Board of Education as an important force
in overseeing local school district compliance, the pending change in state leadership provided an
opportune time to initiate what was termed a consent decree process, that is, a negotiating
procedure designed to produce a series of proposals for final court orders.13 Indeed, the State
Board already had discussed the implications of federal court withdrawal. In January of 1979,
Commissioner Anrig outlined a possible state monitoring role, should the court decide to reduce
its involvement. The court was well aware of these earlier suggestions for an expanded State
Board role and viewed them favorably. For a variety of reasons, by the spring of 1981, the court
was willing to respond to the state’s overtures.
In June of 1981, Commissioner Anrig consulted with his board and his staff about the
conditions of a viable consent decree process. In that same month, preliminary meetings were
held with counsel representing the nine different parties to the case.14 Immediately prior to his
departure from office, Commissioner Anrig sent a letter to Judge Garrity in which he expressed
his personal views regarding two criteria for a successful consent decree process:
For a consent decree process to become a reality, however, the key parties will first
have to demonstrate the same kind of good faith and cooperation in the
development of a recommended consent decree that will be essential for such a
final decree to be implemented. A good beginning has been made but the most
difficult decisions lie ahead. . . . On the basis of my experience in school
desegregation, I do not believe we will find much precedent for the kind of final
consent decree or final order needed in the Morgan case. The parties as well as the
Court will have to be willing to set precedent.15
For the next twenty months, from May 1981 to January 1983, the so-called consent decree
process took place under the direction of then-Special Assistant District Attorney General Robert
H. Bohn Jr. Finally, on December 23, 1982, the court issued its plan for disengagement, which
contained the following major provisions:










a transitional phase of State Board monitoring of school and city defendants’
compliance with the court’s desegregation orders and voluntary desegregation
measures;
a process of dispute resolution with the objective of agreement rather than
adjudication;
a process of mediation whereby, in cases in which the parties fail to reach
agreement after negotiation efforts, the State Board would intervene and attempt
to facilitate agreement;
a mechanism whereby, should mediation fail to produce an agreement, the State
Board would be empowered to prepare a binding recommendation of resolution;
an “ultimate judicial stopgap” (that is, judicial resolution), should the process of
consensual resolution fail;
a process to propose modifications of outstanding court orders; and
a mechanism for further judicial withdrawal after January 1, 1985, based on a
prima facie showing of successful implementation of the transitional
administrative processes.
5
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In its cover memorandum, the court stated that an abiding aim of the desegregation plan was
consensual resolution, consistent with the earlier hope of entering a final consent decree:
The court regards the adversarial judicial process as inhibitive of an ideally
functioning school system in which compliance with constitutional standards is
both voluntary and a matter of course. The process of dispute resolution prescribed
by these orders is intended to create a framework for facilitating the consensual
resolution of disputes related to the desegregation remedy. This framework is not a
substitute for judicial action, but a screen prior to judicial action, to assure that all
possible efforts have been expended toward a satisfactory resolution . . . . [T]he
remedial process, in our opinion, will now be more effectively pursued under an
administrative structure which employs the experience and the common
understanding gained over the years, and which provides the parties with an
opportunity to confront and resolve issues related to curing the constitutional
violation without immediate and inevitable judicial participation.16
Legal Squabbling: Quality and Equality
The 1982 Memorandum and Orders of Disengagement capped months of proposals and
counterproposals made among the twelve attorneys who met, sometimes with School Department
or State Board policy staff, on a regular basis. During the course of the consent decree
proceedings, however, a series of legal and extralegal events took place which influenced
bargaining direction, pace, and position:


A new superintendent of schools, Robert Spillane, and a new commissioner of
education, John Lawson, were appointed in the summer and winter of 1981,
respectively;



The counsel for black plaintiffs, an attorney named Larry Johnson from
Harvard’s Center for Law and Education, withdrew from the consent decree
proceedings and publicly denounced them, claiming his clients’ interests were
not being served. Mr. Johnson stated his intent to work with black parents in the
design and submission of a voluntary student assignment plan emphasizing
educational quality rather than racial balance;



Boston voters approved a referendum expanding the governance structure of the
School Committee and City Council;



School Committee President Jean Sullivan McKeigue initiated an educational
planning process in the summer of 1982, involving parent and community
representatives, to supplement the consent decree negotiations (the group was
known as the Educational Planning Group); and



The Boston Compact was developed, constituting an agreement between chief
executive officers in the Boston business community and the School Department
to provide jobs for high school graduates.

The conditions of proper judicial authority were attended to in a decision handed down by
the First Circuit Court of Appeals in September of 1981. In an opinion pertaining to school
closings, the Appeals Court upheld Judge Garrity’s rulings but advised that the lower court’s
future decisions should more clearly relate to desegregation than to educational issues.17
In addition to influencing the actions of the attorneys engaged in the consent decree process,
these managerial, political, educational, social, and legal forces formed a backdrop to the court’s
deliberations and actions concerning disengagement. Without describing the full effect of these
forces, of particular significance was the visible split within plaintiff class.
Upon the withdrawal of plaintiff counsel, Thomas Atkins, formerly of Boston and recent
general counsel for the NAACP (one of the original parties filing the complaint), filed a motion
6
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with the court seeking permission to appear as a counsel for black plaintiffs. Judge Garrity’s
response was to let both Larry Johnson and Thomas Atkins represent plaintiffs in the consent
decree proceedings. Each attorney claimed to represent plaintiffs’ interests, but each had different
objectives for court disengagement: Mr. Johnson’s objective was a student assignment plan based
on voluntary choice, and Mr. Atkins’s was the continuation of mandatory assignments, albeit with
some refinement.
The split within plaintiff class created repercussions throughout the community and affected
the negotiation process among the attorneys; but the internal disagreements over the nature of the
remedy appropriate to Boston were not new.
One segment of the black community preferred integration and improvement of educational
quality as a method of redressing the grievances cited by plaintiff class. This approach to
desegregation was advocated by those attorneys who filed the original complaint back in 1972.
Another segment of the black community preferred educational improvements whether or not the
schools were desegregated. Racial mixing was not viewed as the primary remedy to the problem
of denial of access to educational quality; an infusion of resources to educationally deficient
schools was considered to be a more effective solution. As Derrick Bell and Ronald Edmonds
point out, this fundamental difference over policy persists throughout the history of desegregation
cases.18 Therefore, the breach between Mr. Atkins and Mr. Johnson was partially grounded in
historical precedent.
Many thoughtful observers, however, considered the public position taken by Mr. Johnson as
a natural outgrowth of Judge Garrity’s remedial plan. Were it not for the racial balance aspects of
the court’s numerous orders, which created a foundation of equity from which changes in
attitudes and behavior could occur, it might be more difficult to argue persuasively for remedies
that did not include racial mixing as a factor. For some, Mr. Johnson’s pronouncements
concerning the development of a voluntary student assignment plan were interpreted as a logical
next step in the lengthy process of achieving quality education in a non discriminatory
environment. For others, though, his actions were viewed as a defection from the ranks of those
committed to educational equality. His position, since it contradicted the legal position originally
held by plaintiff black parents, raised a question as to whether the Morgan case continued to
represent the legitimate concerns of all parents.
Transitional Authority: The Road to Recovery
In spite of the procedural uncertainty inherent in the consent decree proceedings, as well as
questions about the legitimate representation of clients’ interests, the parties produced various
working papers and draft proposals throughout 1981 and 1982. There was no submission,
however, of a single document representing the parties’ proposal for final orders.
After a series of judicial decision points made in response to a variety of circumstances and
conditions, Judge Garrity issued his final order for disengagement in the Boston public schools.19
The court perceived its efforts to promote a consent decree as failing; these orders were intended
to return responsibility for protecting the rights of black and other minority parents and
schoolchildren to the community and School Committee. The court’s orders created mechanisms
for monitoring School Department compliance with desegregation and for third-party dispute
resolution that vastly reduced the need for direct judicial involvement. In delegating primary
responsibilities for monitoring and dispute resolution over the next three years to the State Board
of Education, the stage was set for a return to administrative normalcy.
In a transitional sense, though, the road to recovery meant a change in the relationship
between the city and the state: at the least, the expanded State Board role required an increase in
the level of interaction with the School Department. In its 1982 order, the court required the State
Board to submit a written report to the court, parties, and Citywide Parents Council by January 15
and July 15 of each year the disengagement order remains in effect. In a sense, one form of
dependence was replaced by another.
In carrying out its court-ordered responsibilities, the State Board made every effort to be as
unobtrusive as possible. The good-faith efforts emanating from both the State Department of
7
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Education and the School Department represented a departure from an earlier era of suspicion
and mistrust. Heightened knowledge of School Department operations, coupled with a greater
willingness to cooperate in responding to requests for information, data, and reports, contributed
to a state-local relationship marked by collaboration rather than control.
Adding to the involvement of the State Board of Education in School Department activities
was the appointment of two new members with local ties. Mary Ellen Smith and Loretta Roache
joined the board in 1984 and brought with them a great deal of knowledge and sensitivity about
the desegregation case. In some instances, their presence affected the philosophy and direction of
the State Board; for example, the board became more overtly critical of the court in late 1984 and
revised its own monitoring procedures to make them less detailed and more broadly consultative.
Nevertheless, the intent of the federal court was that there be an interim period for bringing
the case to a close and that the monitoring role of the State Board, as outlined in 1982, be
temporary. While the board continued to generate monitoring reports, the court continued to
reduce its role. In early 1985, the court terminated its jurisdiction in several areas in which
remedial orders were entered, including special education, bilingual education, the institutional
pairings, and student/school safety. It also approved modifications of the student desegregation
plan advanced by school defendants, most notably those creating an experimental district with
greater flexibility in student assignments.
The Restoration of Executive Control: The Court Closes the Case
In July of 1985, Judge Garrity issued his long-awaited draft final judgment for closing the
desegregation case.20 In this memorandum he cited several factors, similar to those referenced in
December 1982, for his action:






The parties’ infrequent use of the dispute resolution process during the interim
period suggested a “common understanding of rights and responsibilities under
the remedial plan’’;
The apparent willingness of the new thirteen-member School Committee to
implement the remedial plan;
The strong public commitment of Boston Mayor Raymond L. Flynn to
educational excellence and desegregation;
The 88.5 percentage level of pupil attendance during the 1985 school year,
which was the highest since 1970–71; and
The monitoring reports generated by the State Board, which provided an
appraisal of progress made and steps to be taken to fulfill the requirements of
the remedial plan.21

Judge Garrity also described the experience of proposing modifications to the desegregation
plan. Although there were several disparate initiatives for modifying the plan throughout 1984,
none was cohesive enough to be subjected to the formal modification process. By December 20,
1984, however, the School Department proposed a series of modifications to final court orders.
Following negotiations among the parties, eight of the eleven proposed modifications were
adopted by the court, in early 1985.
At a court hearing on August 7, 1985, the court outlined a set of principles that would be
used to measure School Department performance. The court’s intent was to provide the
department with discretionary authority to carry out its administrative responsibilities without
judicial oversight. This done, Judge Garrity finally ended the court’s involvement in the school
case when he issued his final orders on September 3, 1985. These orders returned to the School
Committee the authority to run Boston’s public schools.
Clearly, the circumstances, structure, and individuals affecting the Boston public schools
have changed since the liability finding of 1974. While one cannot make the claim that racism
has been eradicated (centuries of conflict cannot be remedied in a decade), few can dispute the
progress of the department, in both attitude and action, toward achieving desegregation. In short,
the school system has regained the right to manage its own affairs.
8
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Ironically, this restoration of local executive authority has occurred at a time when state
government is beginning to play a more prominent role. The educational reform bill signed into
law by Governor Michael S. Dukakis in July 1985 broadened the authority of the state to provide
incentives for educational excellence. Other trends—such as the devolution of the federal
governmental role, the limitations on school district authority imposed by Proposition 2½,
continued public concern with, and interest in, the quality of education, and increased demand for
accountability and performance standards—contribute to the expansion of the state’s influence
over local district operations. For now, however, the opportunity exists for the Boston public
schools to demonstrate that the recovery of its executive power is warranted. Judge Garrity
seemed to feel that it is; if he didn’t, he would have retained active judicial oversight or
transferred the court’s authority to the state.
The final section draws some general conclusions about the optimal process of
disengagement. In attempting to specify basic conditions for the return of agency authority, the
experience of the Boston Housing Authority is used as well. Both Boston cases—differing with
respect to style and scope of judicial intervention, focus of policy, and organizational
characteristics—serve to illuminate more general principles for public management.

The Boston Housing Authority Case
Although the process for withdrawal was neither as formal nor as public as that affecting the
School Department, former superior court judge Paul G. Garrity withdrew active jurisdiction over
the BHA in late 1984. “I’m not ‘sick and tired’ or desperate to get rid of it, but all good things
have to come to an end,” he stated prior to his action. “I’m predisposed to withdraw because I
think the other branches [of government] should be permitted to assume responsibility for the
operations of the BHA and be held accountable.”22 His desire to go into private practice also
contributed to his decision.
Harry Spence resigned as receiver in the fall of 1984 to return to the private sector. Mayor
Flynn appointed former state representative Doris Bunte as his successor in November of 1984.
Because of Ms. Bunte’s experience with and commitment to public housing, her appointment was
greeted enthusiastically by the court and the community.
The Development of System Capacity
There have been many accomplishments since the receivership was imposed on the Authority six
years ago. The progress in such areas as vacancy reduction, rehabilitation, tenant selection, fiscal
management, and security are partly the result of the day-to-day efforts of the receiver and his or
her staff to create a climate of professionalism, thus enabling managerial capability and a sense of
pride to emerge. The gains made in the provision and maintenance of low-income housing in
Boston, however, are not just the result of the actions of committed and capable individuals.
They are also an outgrowth of the special kind of autonomy the receivership afforded. As
pointed out earlier in this article, the receiver was endowed with extraordinary powers relative to
the operations of a highly politicized system. Without the encumbrances of a politically appointed
board and with such benefits as centralized authority, the BHA has been able to make real
improvements in the provision of housing for the poor.
Historically, the BHA was a stepchild of City Hall, with diffuse control and little
administrative or political support. Currently celebrating its fiftieth anniversary year, the BHA
now reports directly to the mayor, with a much broader base of administrative and political
support. A special concern, however, is the extent to which the public housing function can be
effectively discharged without relying too heavily on goodwill or political favoritism.
This is an interim period, then, for the BHA. While the executive administrator reports
directly to the mayor, no final organizational plan has been adopted. In fact, there is some
disagreement as to the best structure for governance and oversight. One view is that an oversight
committee, comprised of tenants, should be delegated responsibilities for monitoring BHA
operations. This position is strongly advocated by Tenants United for Public Housing Progress, a
tenants’ rights group that has done important work organizing resident task forces at the local
9
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project level.
An alternative view is that the public housing function should be integrated with other
housing and development functions in City Hall. In this model, the BHA would not occupy a
direct reporting relationship to the mayor. Organizationally, it would be placed at the same
middle-management level with other offices, such as economic development, community
development, construction and preservation, and public facilities, under the jurisdiction of a
senior official reporting directly to the mayor.23
For now, the BHA continues its work and continues to make progress in such areas as
resident participation and decision making, labor relations, code compliance, and desegregation.
The post-receivership state did not result in uncertainty and confusion, as some observers feared
it would. Under Doris Bunte’s leadership, the process of improving performance,
professionalizing tasks, perfecting newly developed management systems, and upgrading morale
has continued.
Normalizing Race Relations: The Unfinished Agenda
Perhaps the greatest vulnerability in the tenure of the receivership is the issue of race relations.
There currently are three housing developments that remain segregated. As the City resumes
administrative control over the operations of the BHA, it becomes subject to the equity
requirements of state and federal constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions. Should these
segregated conditions not change, chances are that new lawsuits will be filed.
The receivership, with its alliance to the court, acted as a buffer in helping to resolve racial
problems. The Authority therefore was able to employ persuasion rather than confrontation and
encouraged a voluntary approach to dispute resolution. One major example of this mode of
operation was the desegregation of the Charlestown and South Boston developments. After a
year’s discussion, minority families moved peaceably into Charlestown in February of 1984.
There is no question that the full support and backing of Mayor Flynn was needed to help assure
the peaceable desegregation of Charlestown. Indeed, the full support of many city and
neighborhood officials was necessary. The extent to which such support continues to be
forthcoming, as well as the relative success of the Charlestown experience, will affect continued
autonomy. Stated one official, “The Authority would have failed if Charlestown didn’t work.”

Structural Implications and Resources Requirements
The preceding discussion of the BHA receivership and the Boston school desegregation case is
intended to provide a context for understanding what needs to be done to preserve the simple
justice gains made as a result of court intervention. The relinquishment of active court
supervision provides an opportunity, mentioned earlier, for executive and legislative action,
which assures that the courts will not have to reassert their authority. Although controversy will
continue to exist over whether or not the efforts of either Judge Garrity “worked,” concern over
the fate of the schools and public housing could be more productively directed toward initiatives
which commit the provision of municipal services to principles of fairness and dignity, thus
precluding the reentry of the courts into public administration.
Restorative Law and the Boston Public Schools
It’s been eleven years since the liability opinion was issued in the school desegregation case.
Since then, there have been many changes in conditions of schooling in Boston that have helped
bring the system into greater compliance with constitutional requirements. These changes—the
increased level of electoral responsiveness achieved through district representation, the internal
managerial reforms initiated by former superintendent Wood and continued by former
superintendent Spillane, the demographic shifts affecting the school system’s population and
constituents, the current attention to public education which supports new partnerships between
the school system and other important sectors—provided the federal district court with
confidence that the parties to the case could find common ground for resolving outstanding
10
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issues: hence the consent decree process throughout 1981–82 and the transitional disengagement
phase of 1983–85.
The transitional phase of State Board monitoring was essentially smooth. Still to be
determined, however, is the appropriate administrative configuration once the court enters its
final judgment. What are the administrative conditions most conducive to School Department
autonomy which also promote the quality and equality goals of the court?
The propositions in the following sections are made with the hope that they will contribute to
a dialogue about making government work.
Fixing Accountability: Strengthening the Superintendency
One chronic problem affecting the School Department concerns the constraints on the managerial
authority of the superintendent.24 Prior to 1978, the superintendent had no control over business,
facilities, or clerical operations; these functions reported directly to the School Committee. With
the passage in 1978 of Chapter 333, the formal powers of the superintendent were strengthened:
All department operations were brought under the jurisdiction of the superintendent; the middlemanagement tier of associate superintendents was abolished; cabinet-level senior staff units were
created; and the superintendent was given the authority to dismiss certain senior staff members
without School Committee approval.25 Chapter 333 also provided a mandate for further
reorganization of key managerial operations.
It soon became apparent, however, to those in the superintendent’s office that Chapter 333
was more sizzle than steak. While it represented a step in the direction of improved managerial
accountability, it did not provide the superintendent with discretionary authority in personnel or
certain budget areas. The School Committee retains the power of appointment for all categories
of personnel and the power of dismissal for most. The committee also retains authority over the
award of all contracts, and continues to remain involved in certain expenditure-control
procedures. Given the legacy of patronage and the minimal educational inclinations of many
previous committee members, continued involvement of the committee in these aspects of
department operations carries potentially unprofessional consequences.
Every Boston superintendent has learned this over the past ten years. On July 31, 1985, Dr.
Laval Wilson became Boston’s new school superintendent. His appointment provides an
opportunity for a redefinition of the position.
Proposition 1: Chapter 333 should be revised in order to strengthen the managerial
authority of the superintendent
The proper role of the School Committee is to set citywide educational policy and oversee
general system adherence to stated policy objectives. The School Committee should function as
trustee or steward of the Boston public schools, not as manager. With the expansion of the
committee from five members to thirteen, the need for distinguishing between policy-making and
policy-implementing responsibilities became more critical. As we have seen in the past several
months, the behavior or style of some incumbents is not enough to safeguard the School
Department from committee meddling. There needs to be structural reinforcement of managerial
authority so that coherence and accountability in department operations can be achieved.
In 1974, the U.S. District Court declared that the Boston public schools were unlawfully
segregated and that such segregation was the product of purposeful and intentional behavior on
the part of the School Committee. The allocation of resources and the hiring and placement of
personnel were two major categories within which deliberate violations of constitutional
principles were said to have occurred. In 1985, these managerial functions still reside with the
committee, in spite of the trend toward decentralization as represented by school-based
management. While overall allocation of resources is clearly one of the general policy
responsibilities of the School Committee, excessive or minute interference can be confusing and
demoralizing. Judge Garrity’s disengagement order of 1985 restores executive authority to the
School Department. Genuine executive authority should be restored to the superintendent’s
office, and, in turn, that authority could be more genuinely delegated to the local level as the
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result of a new home rule petition that would revise the provisions of Chapter 333.
Maintaining Professionalism: The Need for a Comprehensive Planning Function
In addition to the problem of segmented administrative authority, another chronic managerial
problem affecting School Department operations is the absence (or inadequacy) of a
comprehensive planning function. Currently, responsibilities for long-range planning are ad hoc
and scattered throughout several offices; no office or unit is formally designated to reconcile
individual long-range projections—in areas such as curriculum, facilities, professional support,
personnel, budget, and so on—with system-wide objectives and priorities.
Furthermore, given the deficiency in the strategic planning capacity, there continues to be an
absence of reliable information concerning the effects of various educational initiatives taken in
the past few years. Responsibilities for testing and evaluation have been shuffled around; a
variety of programs (externally funded as well as city funded) have been installed and left to
function without being integrated into regular operations; policy pronouncements have emanated
from either the committee or the superintendent’s office with little rationale to back them up.
Like most public agencies, the School Department experiences great difficulty when it comes to
assessments of programmatic initiatives.
Proposition 2: A senior-level planning office should be established within the School
Department for the purpose of allowing the system seriously to address long-range
educational policy objectives in light of resource availability and desegregation
considerations.
A department-based planning office would promote greater autonomy on another front as well:
Since current public attention on education is likely to result in a number of proposals resembling
‘‘quick fix’’ solutions rather than serious propositions for improving educational quality, school
districts are more vulnerable than ever to the whims of public opinion, political forces, private
ventures, and popular trends. Coupled with greater mayoral and City Council interest in school
operations, a real need exists for the sort of informed and balanced perspective a well-structured
and well-staffed planning office could provide.

Restorative Law and Equal Protection
The focus of this analysis has been on the special circumstances of court-agency relations that
promote court disengagement and eventual administrative normalization. “Getting the court out”
is taken as a desirable objective, but it carries attendant assumptions about what a system and its
leadership need to do to make court withdrawal happen. After all, court intervention in the first
place occurred as the result of institutional behavior that violated somebody’s rights.
Court disengagement can occur only with the knowledge that the institution has somehow
changed, and that individual or group rights will not be violated again.
This article has laid out some structural administrative considerations for the return of
executive power to the Boston public schools. There are, of course, other considerations
conducive to judicial restoration of executive power: changes in the public mood; leadership
personalities and styles; greater political access; public awareness, through the media or other
vehicles, about the operations of public systems; and the development of alternative mechanisms
for resolving conflict without always having to go to court.
The presence of a new mayoral administration and an expanded City Council and School
Committee represent a turning point in the management of public affairs in Boston. The entry of
newcomers into City Hall and Court Street who care about making government work for people
in the neighborhoods throughout the city contributes greatly to institutional accountability and the
restoration of public trust. By all accounts, we are likely to see greater involvement with and
commitment to the provision of public services that are professional and fair. We are, perhaps, on
the verge of an era in which Boston will become known as a city that cares for its people in truly
nondiscriminatory terms and whose public agenda has shifted from equity to economic concerns.
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The forces at work seem to point in this direction.
The hostilities that were directed toward Asians during the summer of 1985 indicate that
prejudice has not disappeared within the City of Boston. Racial incidents continue, and the list of
minority groups discriminated against expands. In the summer of 1984 the Boston City Council
passed a human rights ordinance that outlawed individual or institutional behavior which occurs
in a discriminatory fashion. Still needed, however, is an enforcement mechanism for the
ordinance’s provisions.
There have been many proposals over the years for the creation of a city agency endowed
with the authority to investigate and prosecute charges of discrimination. These proposals are
worth considering, especially given the deëmphasis on federal enforcement of civil rights
protection.
Proposition 3: An Office of Equal Protection within City Hall should be established and
charged with responsibilities for monitoring the performance of all city agencies, resolving
disputes that are the result of complaints and, if necessary, making case referral to the
Corporation Counsel for litigation on matters pertaining to the violation of individual or
group rights as outlined in relevant federal, state, and local laws and regulations.
Such an office should be staffed with individuals who are knowledgeable about public
bureaucratic behavior and skilled in such areas as mediation, bargaining, and negotiation.
Reporting directly to the mayor, the office should have guaranteed access to information, data,
and records and should operate in an “inspector general” fashion. Besides responding to specific
grievances, the office would provide periodic public reports on city performance with regard to
the protection of human rights and the promotion of equal opportunity.
There are several local groups—as well as regional offices of federal agencies—that are
active in the areas of human rights and affirmative action. These groups provide important
pressure and are a source of valuable information as to ways in which government can be made
more accessible. What they lack is the credibility and clout a highly placed, internally based
office can provide. Mayoral establishment of an Office of Equal Protection could draw upon
numerous resources from throughout the city and mobilize them to fruitful action.

Conclusion
This analysis of court-agency relations in Boston is incomplete. While the school case and the
public housing case represent the most dramatic forms of court intervention, there are other
examples. Federal court involvement continues regarding facilities at the Charles Street Jail; still
unresolved in this case are conditions affecting improvement and location of the facilities. Similar
problems continue to exist at the Deer Island House of Correction, which is currently operating
under the terms of a consent decree.
In another area, a dramatic example of court involvement with the management of public
affairs concerned Boston Harbor. As a result of a suit filed against the Metropolitan District
Commission (MDC) by the City of Quincy, former superior court judge Paul G. Garrity
appointed a master in the summer of 1983 to work with the parties to develop harbor cleanup
proposals. Underlying the problems affecting the harbor was an enormous lack of
intergovernmental cooperation. Both federal and state agencies were remiss in maintaining the
harbor, according to the Conservation Law Foundation (CLP). The CLP filed suit in federal court
against both the state and federal governments for failure to curb harbor pollution. For years, the
MDC and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have failed to produce either plans
or a timetable for cleaning up the harbor. State court action was therefore sought to force
development of such plans, as well as to cause jurisdictional cooperation.
Harvard Law Professor Charles M. Haar, the court-appointed master, attempted to negotiate
a remedial plan among the parties. One by-product of these efforts—aided by the support of state
Senate President William Bulger and the work of a gubernatorial harbor study commission first
headed by former governor Francis Sargent—was a legislative bill that created a Massport-like
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Metropolitan Water Resources Authority. The Authority was given responsibilities for initiating
and maintaining a massive cleanup effort serving forty-three communities and featuring the
transfer of relevant personnel and equipment from the MDC.
The legislation languished for almost the entire year, not an unusual fate for such a reformoriented proposal. By the fall of 1984, Judge Paul Garrity’s response to this inertia was to take a
highly public profile and threaten court receivership if the legislature did not act. This colorful
display of judicial power worked; the bill creating the Water Resources Authority was passed, the
eleven- member board appointed, and an interim director appointed in February 1985. A
permanent director was expected to be named by the end of the summer. If the court had not
acted in response to legislative inaction, there probably would be no administrative structure to
clean up the harbor.
A bias running throughout this article is the belief that public administrators and other
officials should discharge their duties in a manner that precludes the necessity of court
intervention and oversight. Sometimes, however, those elected or appointed to public office are
unwilling to perform, or incapable of performing, in accordance with certain constitutionally or
statutorily based standards. As a result, lawsuits are filed, claims are made, and judicial action is
sought to reform agency operations. While the consequences of such reform initiatives are
multiple and public reactions to them mixed, few judges enjoy their managerial role. Speaking to
the senior executive program at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Judge William
Wayne Justice described the averse judicial attitude toward executive intervention:
I believe that I echo the sentiments of all the so-called activist federal judges,
throughout the country, when I tell you I had just as soon have a live rattle- snake
thrust at me as a lawsuit dealing with constitutional claims against an
administrative agency.26
Restorative Law and Administrative Normalization: Some Principles
What are we to conclude about the intergovernmental system if, as often is the case in Boston,
one branch constantly is intervening into the other? Beyond the aforementioned structural
propositions, what more general principles or conclusions might we draw from recent state and
federal court efforts to restore administrative authority to local officials? What are the optimal
conditions for court disengagement?
An important issue to remember is the centrality of the court-agency relationship.
Institutional reform may occur piecemeal and with the participation of many actors, but it occurs
in remedial cases as the result of court decrees. Making interpretations of rights and
responsibilities, a court directs an agency to act in accordance with its perception of the agency’s
capacity to do a better job. Judicial style may vary, but the intent is the same: to provide sanctions
on administrative practices so that a system operates without violating certain guaranteed rights.
As there are several populations affected by court decrees, it is easy to dismiss the primacy
of the court-agency relationship. The plaintiff population and various groups that provide legal
representation to plaintiffs or that represent plaintiffs’ interests are, of course, crucial; until their
rights are vindicated, a case remains active. Another sector affected by court decrees is what has
been termed a secondary population: comprising public officials, the media, special interest
groups, and public opinion (or, more specifically, public concerns about judicial policies), this
group is not directly involved with remedial law cases but strongly influences them—and is
influenced by them.27
Within Boston, members of the secondary population often are vocal in their opinions about
court and agency behavior. One sometimes wonders, in fact, whether a sort of tradition has
developed whereby courts are expected to withstand criticism and intervene, handling
administrative hot potatoes others are more reluctant to deal with.
The point to be made is that although members of a secondary population are not directly
affected by or involved with carrying out judicial policies, their response to the court-agency
interplay carries a great deal of weight. Public statements made by the mayor, news coverage and
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editorials in the local media and press, the behavior of the state legislature and government, the
efforts of the private sector—all of these forces contribute to a court’s assessment of the readiness
of the community in general and the agency in particular to take back management responsibility.
One generalization, then, to be made about court disengagement is that there needs to be
some evidence, expressed by members of the secondary population, of commitment to the public
provision of services which are both equitable and just. This demonstration of essential
agreement with basic principles governing the remedial regime provides assurance to a court that
the environment can provide sanctions on administrative behavior without the necessity of active
judicial oversight.
The nature of the secondary population’s role leads to a second generalization: the greater the
extent to which it can provide assistance to the agency in the post-remedial phase, the greater the
likelihood of disengagement. For example, the involvement of the business and finance
communities with the Boston public schools generates much-needed local support but also sets a
standard for further interaction. The same can be said for the involvement of The Boston
Foundation with the city’s schools and the Housing Authority. The commitment and engagement
of civic leaders to the restoration of public services constitutes a public-private partnership of the
highest order; this fortification, upon emergence from court oversight, is essential to the growth
and well-being of an autonomous system. After all, it took years of neglect and isolation to
establish the characteristics of those systems destined for court intervention.
A third generalization with regard to executive recovery concerns the implementing agency.
As we have seen, agencies often are limited in their capacity to implement judicial decrees. An
agency’s tradition and policy preference, resource base, and organizational characteristics all
contribute to its capacity to comply with remedial principles. One would expect that, if anything,
the remedial phase would have fostered new organizational values, patterns, and behaviors;
ideally, these new traits could withstand the transition to a post-remedial state. The apparent
internalization of new attitudes and practices becomes another measure, then, of system readiness
to regain its authority. The educational function of the remedial phase—that is, the extent to
which it helps an organization focus on changing its ways—helps determine the extent of this
internalization and whether or not it can last.
Related to this is another generalization regarding court disengagement. In both the school
desegregation and public housing cases, the court signaled its intent to withdraw and then provide
an interim transition period aimed at closure. There were differences in the transition process
used just as there were differences in the mode of intervention, but in each case it was necessary
to formalize an interim period. It is not easy to move a system from dependence to independence
overnight; both courts and agencies need to recognize that divorce needs to be preceded by a
period of trial separation.
During the interim transitional period, the presence of a set of monitoring procedures
provides a gauge as to organizational readiness to absorb greater responsibilities. As with State
Board monitoring of the Boston public schools, the monitoring process needs to generate
information about what has been accomplished with regard to compliance. In addition, as was
learned by the State Board, the monitoring process must be oriented toward institutional selfsufficiency. This forward-looking characteristic of institutional review is a tricky one for a
regulatory agency to maintain; the State Board sometimes lost sight of this part of its role.
Therefore, a fifth generalization regarding court disengagement is that the monitoring period
should be specifically directed toward agency autonomy. Maintaining the tension between
oversight and deliverance requires special skills and procedures; a clear understanding of the
monitoring mandate permits a more effective deployment of staff resources. The evaluation
process should be carried out by individuals who recognize their educational responsibilities as
well.
Perhaps the most visible characteristic of the disengagement process affecting the school
desegregation case was the active participation of the parties in the negotiation process. It took
months before the attorneys representing the parties, accustomed as they were to courtroom
ritual, could develop a productive negotiating style. Indeed, the adversarial process does not lend
itself easily to long range policy formulation, especially when it is carried out by representatives
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of key actors. Two more generalizations, therefore, are that elements of the negotiation process
should be understood by the parties from the outset, and a commitment to this process should be
obtained and maintained. The consent decree process in the school case was crippled by the
uneven participation of plaintiff attorneys. A commitment to participate fully in negotiations for
modification of court orders might have speeded up the disengagement process.
Finally, a major lesson emerging from the remedial experience is the need for greater
knowledge and experience of the world of the court and the world of public management. While
it may sound trite, the language, customs, and procedures of these two worlds are different. In the
remedial and post-remedial stages of institutional reform litigation, the two worlds are bound
together in a manner that can be irritating. To achieve the desired status of institutional
compliance and self-sufficiency, there must be more intelligence on both sides of the bench. A
final generalization, then, is that public managers, judges, and lawyers should be made aware of
the subtleties and requirements of both the world of judicial review and the world of public
management. In this way, the precepts of the Constitution and the public interest will be better
served.
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